印象中美國(guó)的核安全監(jiān)管是非常到位的，但無(wú)憂科學(xué)家聯(lián)盟（http://www.ucsusa.org）作為獨(dú)立第三方持續(xù)多年對(duì)美國(guó)的核能安全和NRC的監(jiān)管給予了高度的關(guān)注。2014年2月27日，他們按照自己的觀點(diǎn)對(duì)2013年美國(guó)核電站安全和NRC的監(jiān)管給予了評(píng)判。本人試著翻譯一下摘要，以供大家參閱。

本人特別聲明：本人未獲無(wú)憂科學(xué)家聯(lián)盟網(wǎng)站的授權(quán)翻譯（也未進(jìn)行校對(duì)），只是從科普志愿者的角度分享一種觀點(diǎn)，不用于商業(yè)用途，如有異議，本人將刪除相關(guān)博文；本人承諾不會(huì)應(yīng)用于商業(yè)行為，也請(qǐng)轉(zhuǎn)載者承諾不用于商業(yè)行為。

本人聲明：本人未對(duì)UCS所闡述的案例做過(guò)仔細(xì)研究。該文只代表UCS的觀點(diǎn)而不代表譯者的觀點(diǎn)。

本人觀點(diǎn)：UCS利用核電行業(yè)公開披露的信息做出了相應(yīng)的評(píng)價(jià)，在給予NRC工作充分肯定的同時(shí)對(duì)其不足給予了批評(píng)。這種批評(píng)也許存在于對(duì)事情的認(rèn)識(shí)不一樣，也許是掌握的信息不一樣，也許是NRC和核電廠真實(shí)的不足，但質(zhì)疑有助于核安全水平的提高！有專業(yè)素養(yǎng)的第三方參與對(duì)提升監(jiān)管和核安全水平非常有幫助！信息的充分披露，第三方的獨(dú)立意見等都值得國(guó)內(nèi)學(xué)習(xí)！

報(bào)告摘要原文地址：http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/NRC-Nuclear-Safety-Report-2013-summary.pdf

報(bào)告全文地址：http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/NRC-Nuclear-Safety-Report-2013.pdf

The NRC and Nuclear Power Plant Safety in 2013

——More Jekyll, Less Hyde

美國(guó)核管會(huì)和2013年核電廠的安全性

——多些Jekyll，少些Hyde

OUR FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT CARD

我們第四年度報(bào)告卡

前言

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is charged with enforcing safety regulations at U.S. nuclear power plants to protect the public from harm. To do this it must actively monitor reactors and aggressively engage with owners and workers when it does find safety violations.

美國(guó)核管理委員會(huì)（NRC）負(fù)責(zé)執(zhí)行美國(guó)核電廠安全規(guī)制工作以保護(hù)公眾免受傷害。為此，必須主動(dòng)監(jiān)測(cè)反應(yīng)堆，并且當(dāng)發(fā)現(xiàn)違反安全規(guī)定時(shí)積極與業(yè)主和工人接觸。

The Union of Concerned Scientists has evaluated safety issues at U.S. nuclear power plants for more than 40 years. We have repeatedly found the NRC to be capable of enforcing its safety regulations—yet we have also repeatedly found its enforcement to be not timely, consistent, or effective.

無(wú)憂科學(xué)家聯(lián)盟（UCS）對(duì)美國(guó)核電廠的安全問(wèn)題評(píng)估超過(guò)40年。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)NRC一直能夠執(zhí)行其安全法規(guī)，然而我們也總是發(fā)現(xiàn)他們的執(zhí)行不及時(shí)、不符合邏輯或效果不好。

This report, like its three predecessors, examines NRC actions during the previous year and chronicles what the commission did right and what it did wrong. Our goal is to help the NRC achieve more of the former and avoid more of the latter—before an avoidable accident costs American lives.

和前三分報(bào)告類似，本報(bào)告審查了NRC過(guò)去一年的行動(dòng)，并記錄了NRC做對(duì)了什么、做錯(cuò)了什么。我們的目標(biāo)是幫助NRC在事故影響美國(guó)人生活成本之前實(shí)現(xiàn)事前（控制）并避免事后（惡果）。

Robert Louis Stevenson’s classic Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, first published in 1886, dealt with the split personality experienced by the friendly and mild-mannered Dr. Henry Jekyll and his alter ego, the evil Mr. Edward Hyde. Stevenson’s short novel is brought to mind by the apparent dual personality and bizarre behavior traits of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

羅伯特路易斯史蒂文森1886年首次出版的關(guān)于基爾醫(yī)生和海德先生的案例，闡述了友善且溫和、人格分裂的亨利杰基爾博士和他的另一面——邪惡的愛(ài)德華海德先生。史蒂文森的短篇小說(shuō)帶給人們關(guān)注起美國(guó)核管理委員會(huì)（NRC）明顯的雙重性格和怪異的行為舉止。

On one hand, the NRC is a fair and effective regulator, establishing and enforcing safety regulations that subject neither nuclear plant owners to undue burdens nor workers and the public to undue risks. While no one can count the number of accidents that the NRC’s efforts have averted, the trend over the past three decades in the declining number of “near-misses” and safety problems is highly suggestive that much of the time the agency does its job well. On the other hand, the NRC sometimes acts as if it is channeling Mr. Hyde.

一方面，NRC是一個(gè)公平有效的監(jiān)管者，建立和執(zhí)行安全法規(guī)，既反對(duì)任何核電站承受不必要的負(fù)擔(dān)，也反對(duì)任何的工人和公眾承擔(dān)過(guò)度的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。雖然沒(méi)有人能夠算清楚NRC的努力避免了多少事故，但過(guò)去三十年未遂事件和安全問(wèn)題數(shù)量下降的趨勢(shì)高度說(shuō)明了機(jī)構(gòu)（NRC）大部分時(shí)間做得很好。另一方面，NRC行為有時(shí)又像海德先生一樣。

Inconsistencies in the NRC’s actions and inactions last year (2013) invoked both Jekyll and Hyde. As described in Chapter 2 of our report (online at www.ucsusa.org/nrc2013), the NRC’s inspectors repeatedly compelled the owner of the Columbia Generating Station to identify and correct the underlying causes of recurring problems with a vital air conditioning unit. But after identifying several examples of inadequate procedures and training at the LaSalle nuclear plant, the NRC’s inspectors let the owner off the hook entirely. Yet, when very similar problems surfaced at the H.B. Robinson and Browns Ferry nuclear plants, the NRC compelled the owners to rectify the deficiencies.

去年（2013）NRC的作為和不作為的不一致性讓人想起了基爾和海德。正如我們報(bào)告第2章描述（在www.ucsusa.org/nrc2013在線），NRC的監(jiān)督員反復(fù)強(qiáng)調(diào)哥倫比亞發(fā)電站業(yè)主識(shí)別并糾正一個(gè)重要空調(diào)機(jī)組經(jīng)常出的問(wèn)題的根本原因。但在識(shí)別 LaSalle 核電廠程序不足和培訓(xùn)的幾個(gè)例子后，NRC監(jiān)督員讓業(yè)主完全脫離了“困境”。然而，當(dāng)在 H.B. Robinson和 Browns Ferry核電站出現(xiàn)非常相似的問(wèn)題時(shí)，NRC強(qiáng)迫業(yè)主糾正缺陷。

Note: AIT = augmented inspection team; SIT = special inspection team.

備注：AIT：擴(kuò)大性檢查團(tuán)隊(duì)；SIT：專項(xiàng)檢查團(tuán)隊(duì)

The strange cases of the Fort Calhoun and Diablo Canyon nuclear plants provide further evidence of the NRC’s dichotomy. As described in Chapter 4, the NRC did not allow the Fort Calhoun reactor in Nebraska to operate until known safety shortcomings were corrected. Yet as described in Chapter 5, the NRC allowed the two reactors at the Diablo Canyon plant in California to continue operating despite its owner failing to resolve known safety shortcomings. The unresolved problems at Diablo Canyon involve inadequate protection against earthquakes. When similar earthquake protection deficiencies were identified at the Beaver Valley, Humboldt Bay, Maine Yankee, San Onofre, Surry, and West Valley nuclear facilities, the NRC’s Dr. Jekyll ordered them shut down until their owners had provided adequate protections against the earthquake hazards. Yet today, the NRC’s Mr. Hyde allows Diablo Canyon to operate despite the known risks.

Fort Calhoun和Diablo Canyon 核電站的奇怪案例為NRC的兩面性提供了進(jìn)一步的證據(jù)。如第4章所述，NRC不允許內(nèi)布拉斯加州的Fort Calhoun反應(yīng)堆在確信安全問(wèn)題得到糾正之前運(yùn)行。然而，如第5章所述，NRC卻允許弗吉尼亞Diablo Canyon 核電站在業(yè)主未能解決已知安全問(wèn)題之前繼續(xù)運(yùn)行。Diablo Canyon未解決的問(wèn)題涉及到關(guān)于地震的額外防護(hù)不足。同樣的地震防護(hù)不足也在Beaver Valley、Humboldt Bay、Maine Yankee、San Onofre、Surry和West Valley 核設(shè)施被發(fā)現(xiàn)。NRC的“Jekyll博士”要求在業(yè)主停堆直至提供了抵御地震災(zāi)害足夠的防護(hù)。就在今天，NRC的“海德先生”卻明知風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的情況下允許Diablo Canyon 核電站運(yùn)行。

Giving the NRC the benefit of doubt, one might assume there are nuances explaining why entirely opposite reactions to the same set of facts can somehow both be right. The strange case of Oconee clearly shows this is not the case.As described in Chapter 5, the NRC approved an amendment to the operating licenses for the three reactors at the Oconee Nuclear Station in Seneca, South Carolina, in 2010 contingent on its owner completing safety fixes by December 31, 2012.

給NRC懷疑的好處，我們可以認(rèn)為這里有細(xì)微差別來(lái)解釋為什么一種事實(shí)情況下有完全相反的反應(yīng)。Oconee（核電站）的奇怪案例清楚地表明了情況并非如此。如第5章所述，2010年，在假定業(yè)主在2012年前完成安全問(wèn)題糾正的前提下，NRC批復(fù)了南卡羅來(lái)納州塞內(nèi)卡的Oconee核電站三座反應(yīng)堆運(yùn)行執(zhí)照的修訂。

The owner asked the NRC in July 2012 for permission to extend this deadline by two years. In January 2013, the NRC’s Dr. Jekyll denied the request on the grounds that the risk was too high to allow the fixes to be delayed that long. But in July 2013, the NRC’s Mr. Hyde ordered the company to complete the fixes no later than November 15, 2016—nearly two years after the owner’s initial extension request that had been rejected as being too unsafe.

2012年7月，業(yè)主要求NRC同意該限期延長(zhǎng)兩年。2013年1月，NRC的“Jekyll博士”因允許延遲太久、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)太高為由拒絕了此要求。但2013年7月，NRC的“海德先生”要求公司在不遲于2016年11月15日前完成整改——這一時(shí)間比當(dāng)初因?yàn)椴话踩脑虮痪芙^的業(yè)主初始延期申請(qǐng)還晚了近2年。

A second strange case of Oconee covered in Chapter 5 involved the NRC’s Dr. Jekyll formally requiring the plant’s owner in June 2010 to take more than a dozen measures to lessen the chances that the upstream Jocassee Dam (owned by the same company) could fail and to better protect the plant against flooding in the event the dam fails anyway. The NRC’s justification for this mandate included its determination that if the dam failed, there was a 100 percent chance that flooding would cause the three reactors at Oconee to melt down. The NRC’s Mr. Hyde then intervened to improperly with hold all the correspondence about this hazard from the public. Worse still, the NRC conducted its annual public meeting in the community near the Oconee nuclear plant in April 2011, a month after tsunami flooding caused three reactors at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station to melt down. The exact same flooding hazard that exists today at the Oconee nuclear plant was not mentioned by the NRC—so the public was actually misled into believing no such problems existed.

第5章提及的關(guān)于Oconee（核電站）第二個(gè)奇怪案例涉及到NRC的“Jekyll博士”2010年6月正式要求核電站業(yè)主為降低上游喬卡西大壩垮壩（與業(yè)主同屬一家公司）的概率，并在垮壩的情況下電站防御住洪水而采取數(shù)十項(xiàng)措施。NRC在此命令中的判斷（依據(jù)）包括它自己的判斷——如果垮壩，洪水將百分之百導(dǎo)致Oconee（核電站）三個(gè)反應(yīng)堆熔堆。NRC的“海德先生”然后不當(dāng)介入，阻止了應(yīng)對(duì)公眾風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的一切措施。更糟的是，2011年4月，就在日本福島第一核電站因海嘯洪水導(dǎo)致三座反應(yīng)堆熔堆事故后的一個(gè)月，NRC組織了Oconee核電站周邊社區(qū)的年度公眾會(huì)議。Oconee核電站現(xiàn)實(shí)存在的完全類似的洪災(zāi)卻未被NRC提及——公眾被誤導(dǎo)而相信這樣的問(wèn)題不存在。

To be sure, the NRC is far more Jekyll than Hyde, as evidenced by the improving trends over the past three decades. But with so many American lives at stake, even a cameo appearance by the NRC’s Mr. Hyde is too much. If an earthquake near Diablo Canyon or a failure of the Jocassee Dam harmed people, the NRC would be unable to look Americans in the eyes and honestly claim it had taken every reasonable measure to prevent the disaster.

可以肯定的是，NRC的“Jekyll”角色遠(yuǎn)勝于“Hyde”角色，過(guò)去超過(guò)三十年持續(xù)改進(jìn)的趨勢(shì)可以為此證明。但考慮到眾多美國(guó)人的危險(xiǎn)境地，就算NRC客串一次“Hyde”也是太多了。如果Diablo Canyon附近發(fā)生地震或喬卡西大壩垮壩傷害了人民，NRC將沒(méi)有辦法面對(duì)美國(guó)人民并誠(chéng)懇地宣稱它已就阻止災(zāi)難發(fā)生做出不懈努力。
More Jekyll, less Hyde is this critic’s choice for the NRC’s future.

“多些Jekyll，少些Hyde”才是NRC未來(lái)的關(guān)鍵選擇。

Recommendations

建議
Chapter 2 summarizes near-misses that the NRC reported at U.S. nuclear plants last year. The lessons learned from the nearmisses described in Chapter 2 are:

第2章總結(jié)了NRC去年報(bào)告的美國(guó)核電站的未遂事件。第2章描述的未遂事件的教訓(xùn)如下：
• The NRC and the nuclear industry should study the Arkansas Nuclear One near-miss to identify and institutionalize the elements that contributed to the successful response on the part of plant operators.

• NRC和核工業(yè)應(yīng)該就ANO核電站未遂進(jìn)行研究，以識(shí)別有助于部分電站操縱員成功應(yīng)對(duì)的要素并制度化。
• The NRC should periodically re-inspect fixes to safety problems, such as those mandated by the agency’s generic communications program, to determine whether they continue to be effective.
• NRC應(yīng)當(dāng)定期對(duì)安全問(wèn)題的整治進(jìn)行復(fù)檢，例如通過(guò)機(jī)構(gòu)通用通訊流程發(fā)布命令以判斷這些問(wèn)題是否繼續(xù)存在。

• The NRC should revise its license renewal process to provide assurance that reactors are operating in a manner consistent with applicable regulatory requirements.

• NRC應(yīng)修改其延壽許可程序以提供保障確保反應(yīng)堆運(yùn)行遵從所適用的規(guī)制要求。

• The NRC and the nuclear industry should protect against human performance impairment caused by fatigue at all times, not just when reactors are operating.

• NRC和核工業(yè)應(yīng)當(dāng)防止任何時(shí)候因疲勞而導(dǎo)致人為功能障礙，而不僅僅反應(yīng)堆運(yùn)行期間。

As Chapter 3 shows, such near-misses have been occurring at a rate of more than one per month over the past four years. Given enough chances, it seems only a matter of time before near-misses become an actual hit. Public safety would be better served by reducing the frequency of near-misses. The NRC should take two steps to better protect the public:

如第3章所述，在過(guò)去的4年每月有不止一件未遂事件發(fā)生。如果機(jī)會(huì)充足，未遂成為實(shí)際的重大打擊（事件）似乎只是時(shí)間問(wèn)題。公眾安全依賴于降低未遂發(fā)生頻次。NRC應(yīng)該在更好地保護(hù)公眾方面兩步走：
• Each special inspection team (SIT), augmented inspection team (AIT), and incident inspection team (IIT) should include a formal evaluation of the NRC’s baseline inspection effort. The baseline inspection effort covers the array of routine inspections conducted by the NRC at every nuclear plant. When an SIT, AIT, or IIT identifies safety violations that contributed to the near-miss, the NRC’s evaluation should determine whether the baseline inspection effort could have, and should have, found the safety violations sooner. Such insights from the near-misses may enable the NRC to make adjustments in what its inspectors examine, how they examine it, and how often they examine it to increase the chances of finding potential violations.

• 每一次專項(xiàng)檢查團(tuán)隊(duì)（SIT）、擴(kuò)大檢查團(tuán)隊(duì)（AIT）和事故檢查團(tuán)隊(duì)（IIT）都應(yīng)該組織對(duì)NRC基線檢查的正常評(píng)估?；€檢查應(yīng)覆蓋NRC在每座電站主導(dǎo)的常規(guī)監(jiān)督。當(dāng)一個(gè)SIT、AIT或IIT識(shí)別出造成未遂事件的違反安全（行為）時(shí)，NRC的評(píng)估應(yīng)決定基線檢查是否可以有而且必須有，迅速找出違反安全（行為）。未遂事件的審查將使得NRC調(diào)整它們的監(jiān)督員的檢查事項(xiàng)、檢查流程以及檢查頻度，從而增加發(fā)現(xiàn)潛在違規(guī)事件的機(jī)會(huì)。
• Plant owners must be required to formally evaluate why their routine testing and inspection regimes failed to find longstanding problems. Many of the near-misses in Chapter 2 involved design and operational problems that existed for years, sometimes decades. The testing and inspection regimes are intended to find and fix such problems preventively, but clearly failed to do so. Plants’ programmatic weaknesses must be remedied to offer better protection against future near-misses.

• 必須要求電廠業(yè)主正式評(píng)估為什么他們的常規(guī)試驗(yàn)和監(jiān)督制度不能找到長(zhǎng)期存在問(wèn)題。第2章中得多個(gè)未遂包括了存在多年（有的是數(shù)十年）的設(shè)計(jì)和運(yùn)行問(wèn)題。試驗(yàn)和監(jiān)督制度的目的就是用來(lái)發(fā)現(xiàn)并預(yù)防性修正這些問(wèn)題，但顯然這一目的未實(shí)現(xiàn)。電站的程序性缺陷必須被糾正以更好地防止未來(lái)的未遂事件。

Note: AIT = augmented inspection team; SIT = special inspection team.

備注：AIT：擴(kuò)大性檢查團(tuán)隊(duì)；SIT：專項(xiàng)檢查團(tuán)隊(duì)